最適獨佔管制收購、 補貼與不干預政策之比較
Optimal Monopoly Regulations: Comparison of Procurement, Subsidy and Non-intervention
國立中山大學經濟學研究所副教授(Associate Professor, Institute of Economics, National Sun Yat-Sen University)、彰化銀行東高雄分行辦事員(Officer, Chang Hwa Bank)
摘要
本文修訂 Laffont and Tirole (1986) 與 Laffont and Martimort (2002) 之最適收購管制模型,在生產效能與心力付出程度皆為私有資訊之情況下,比較收購、 補貼與不干預三種獨佔管制方案之社會福利效果。我們發現: (1) 補貼政策比收購政策更能激勵生產者自發之心力投入;(2) 只要廠商在收購方案下之 「設算虧損」 不高,則改採最適補貼政策更能提升福利水準;(3) 若生產者創造利潤之效能夠高,則最適補貼政策之福利效果亦優於不干預政策。
Abstract
The paper modifies Laffont and Tirole (1986) and Laffont and Martimort (2002) model of government procurement for monopoly regulation, and applies it to deduce an optimal scheme of subsidy. We find out that: (1) the optimal scheme of subsidy is more effective in providing an incentive to increase the producer's offort than government procurement; (2) when there are `imputed profits' for the producer under a regulated procurement, a subsidy scheme may create higher social welfare; (3) as long as profits of an inefficient producer without intervention are not too small, the subsidy scheme promotes social welfare more than non-intervention policy.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 38卷3期
- 出版
- 2010年09月
- 頁碼
- 413–434
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006809
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