懲罰怠惰、流失人才?升等續聘標準的經濟分析
Punishing Shirkers and Brain Drain: An Economic Analysis of a Stricter Standard for Academic Promotion and Review
中央研究院經濟研究所(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
摘要
要提升學術研究績效,在短期要使聘用人才努力以赴,在長期要吸引傑出人才並淘汰不適任者。本文分析一個簡單的偷懶反淘汰模型,指出提高升聘標準來刺激研究績效的想法,雖然短期有克服偷懶問題的好處,關於人才流動的長期觀點上則利弊互見。提高升續標準,長期雖可淘汰素質不佳人員,達到懲罰怠惰去蕪存菁的斷尾效果,但也會因不能吸引人才,付出懲罰怠惰流失人才的代價。若學術的突破,主要仰賴傑出人士的熱忱投入,而非依靠淘汰能力較差者,則提高升聘標準的斷尾利得可能無法彌補菁英流失的損失,長期將使研究績效不升反降。
Abstract
Popular wisdom has it that a stricter standard for academic promotion and/or review will improve the research productivity of scholars. My belief is that the popular wisdom is right in the short-run, but it may be wrong in the long-run. A stricter standard can deter the shirking problem among scholars and improve their research performance (the short-run effect), but it may discourage able youth from entering this professional and result in lower research productivity in the future (the long-run effect). A shirking-adverse selection efficiency wage model is set up to show this belief.
關鍵詞
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 37卷3期
- 出版
- 2009年09月
- 頁碼
- 301–323
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006825
同期目錄
- 台灣製造業廠商對外投資時機之研究林惠玲(Hui-Lin Lin);陳正倉(Jeng-Chang Chen);詹立宇(Li-Yu Chan)・頁 237–267
- 採用電子商務對台灣製造業總要素生產力的影響劉定焜(Ting-Kun Liu);陳忠榮(Jong-Rong Chen);黃盈棠(Ying-Tang Huang)・頁 269–300
- 懲罰怠惰、流失人才?升等續聘標準的經濟分析林忠正(Chung-Cheng Lin)・頁 301–323
- 柏瑞圖增進的查核機制改革翁堃嵐(Kun-Lan Ueng)・頁 325–345