關稅率配額自由化與出口廠商研發
Tariff-Rate Quotas, Trade Liberalization and the Strategic R&D Behavior of an Exporting Firm
南台科技大學國際企業系(Department of International Business, Southern Taiwan University);國立中山大學政治經濟學系(Department of Political Economics, National Sun Yat-Sen University);國立臺灣大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Taiwan University)
- 卷期
- 37卷2期
- 出版
- 2009年06月
- 頁碼
- 135–160
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006829
摘要
本文建立一兩階段賽局模型並藉以探討進口國不同貿易自由化政策,對於出口國廠商研發行爲的影響。對一個實施關稅率配額的進口國而言,它的自由化可採取,降低配額內關稅,降低配額外關稅,或增加配額等三種方式來達成。這三種自由化方式對出口商研發之影響方向不盡相同。當關稅率配額中之配額限制爲有效時,我們發現,進口國(1)降低配額內關稅對出口商之研發沒有影響;(2)調降配額外關稅稅率,則可能會提升出口國廠商研發水準;(3)放寬配額之額度,則可能會使出口廠商的研發水準不升反降。本文建立一兩階段賽局模型並藉以探討進口國不同貿易自由化政策,對於出口國廠商研發行爲的影響。對一個實施關稅率配額的進口國而言,它的自由化可採取,降低配額內關稅,降低配額外關稅,或增加配額等三種方式來達成。這三種自由化方式對出口商研發之影響方向不盡相同。當關稅率配額中之配額限制爲有效時,我們發現,進口國(1)降低配額內關稅對出口商之研發沒有影響;(2)調降配額外關稅稅率,則可能會提升出口國廠商研發水準;(3)放寬配額之額度,則可能會使出口廠商的研發水準不升反降。
Abstract
This paper uses a two-country model with one exporting country and one importing country to examine the effect of trade liberalization on the strategic R&D behavior of an exporting firm. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the importing country can choose different trade liberalization policies with regard to a tariff-rate quota. These policies include a lower in-quota tariff, a lower over-quota tariff or a higher quota level. In the second stage, there are one foreign firm and one domestic firm competing in Cournot fashion in the home country market. We find that the three trade liberalization policies may generate significantly different effects on the R&D behavior of the foreign (exporting) firm. Lowering the in (over) - quota tariff tends to increase (has no effect on) the R&D level of the foreign exporting firm, but relaxing the quota in contrast may decrease the R&D level.