本國市場存在仿冒下的進口關稅
The Optimal Import Tariff in the Presence of Domestic Counterfeiting
國立中央大學產業經濟研究所博士班(Ph.D. Student, Institute of Industrial Economics, National Central University);國立中央大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Central University)
- 卷期
- 36卷2期
- 出版
- 2008年06月
- 頁碼
- 271–292
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006853
摘要
在一外國正版廠商出口至本國,本國市場可能出現仿冒品的模型設定下,本文討論本國政府如何對外國正版品廠商課徵最適關稅。我們亦考慮此一產品可能存在網路外部性的情況。首先,我們發現,無論網路外部性是否存在,若本國市場存在仿冒的可能,則當獨占正版廠商的生產成本提高時,本國政府會大幅提高關稅。其次,當仿冒存在且產品的網路外部性夠大,則最適進口關稅也可能反而會隨外國廠商的成本增加而提高。上述二結論不同於文獻上一般認為最適關稅應與廠商成本呈反向關係的認知。最後,我們也發現,當本國執法部門取締仿冒的執法程度提高,則外國正版廠商面對的最適進口關稅也會因此提高。
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce counterfeiting into a vertical difference model. We are concerned about the relationship between the tariff policy made by the home government, the original firm and social welfare. We find the following results. First, regardless of the network externalities of the product, the optimal tariff will rise as the cost to the foreign firm increases when counterfeiting firms emerge. Second, when the counterfeiting occurs and network externalities of the product are sufficiently large, the optimal tariff will also increase with the cost of the foreign firm. Last, if the foreign firm asks government to take law enforcement measures, the import tariff on the original product will increase instead.