臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

自我融資、訊息不對稱與政府支出

Self-financing, Asymmetric Information, and Government Spending in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model

洪福聲(Fu-Sheng Hung);廖玩如(Wan-Ru Liao)

國立台北大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Taipei University);致遠管理學院企業管理學系(Department of Business Administration, Diwan College of Management)

卷期
35卷3期
出版
2007年09月
頁碼
249–284
編號
NTUEJ00006862
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摘要

本文設定一個具有訊息不對稱與自我融資情形的內生成長模型檢驗最適政府支出比例。我們發現低度金融發展程度國家中的企業家將選擇自我融資,故政府支出比例提升將不會惡化體系中的訊息不對稱問題。由於低度開發國家的金融部門發展程度相對低於已開發國家,本文結果隱含低度開發國家的最適政府支出比例相對高於已開發國家者。此一結果與近來實證文獻相符合。

Abstract

This paper examines the optimal tax rate, or equivalently the optimal size of government spending, in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information and self-financing. We show that borrowers in countries with less-developed financial sectors may choose to be self-financed so that an increase in the tax rate may not exacerbate the problem of asymmetric information. Since financial sectors are less developed in less-developed countries than in developed ones, our result implies that the optimal tax rate should be larger in less-developed countries than that in developed ones. This result is consistent with recent empirical evidence.

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