價格上限管制與多人藍氏訂價
Price-Cap Regulations and Many-Person Ramsey Pricing
國立中央大學產業經濟研究所(Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics, National Central University);朝陽科技大學會計系(Department of Accounting, Chaoyang University of Technology)
- 卷期
- 34卷4期
- 出版
- 2006年12月
- 頁碼
- 392–416
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006875
摘要
本文旨在分析畢氏與拉氏價格上限管制在多產品獨占情況下的效果,特別是,本文將驗證價格上限管制是否能產生藍氏訂價的價格結構。另外,本文探討了管制者應該如何設計初始的價格向量,以期能厲行採用藍氏訂價的價格結構。在本文的模型中,包含著一家多產品的獨占廠商與連續分佈的消費者,並於獨占廠商與消費者之間存在著不對稱訊息。本文提出一項新的方法來研究異質消費者的情形:在推導數量方面的藍氏法則時,Roy恆等式、Slutsky方程式以及替代矩陣的對稱性,這三個性質扮演著重要的角色。本文在進行檢驗的議題之前,先著手研究這三項性質應該如何去修正,以便由個別需求函數推廣到總需求函數。這種迂迴的方法簡化了數學計算,並突顯了消費者異質之下的特別效果。
Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of Paasche and Laspeyres price-cap regulations upon a multi-product monopolist. In particular, this paper addresses whether the price-cap regulations yield Ramsey price structures. Further, this paper examines how the regulator should design the base price vector in order to enforce the use of the Ramsey price structure. The model in this paper uses one multi-product monopolist and a continuum of consumers, and there is asymmetric information. This paper proposes a new approach to studying the case with heterogeneous consumers. Roy's identity, the Slutsky equation and the symmetric property of the substitution matrix play important roles in deriving the Ramsey rule in quantities. This paper begins by showing how the three properties should be revised for an aggregate demand function, compared with an individual demand function. This approach simplifies the algebra, and highlights the particular effects in the heterogeneous case.