臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

進口競爭與最適品質研發補貼政策

Import Competition and the Optimal Quality-related R&D Subsidy

吳世傑(Shih-Jye Wu);林燕淑(Yan-Shu Lin)

國立中山大學政治經濟系(Department of Political Economy, National Sun Yat-Sen University);國立東華大學經濟系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University)

卷期
34卷1期
出版
2006年03月
頁碼
001–026
編號
NTUEJ00006886
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摘要

在貿易政策中,一般討論品質內生化的論文大都假設本國廠商為高品質產品生產者或低品質產品生產者後進行分析,本文並不作此限制。我們設立一個簡單的垂直產品差異模型,假設外國廠商之產品品質為外生既定,探討本國在福利極大化目標下如何藉由品質研發補貼政策以影響廠商之產品品質選擇。本文顯示,當本國廠商為高品質產品生產者時,本國廠商存在一個最適品質水準,本國政府之最適品質補貼政策須視消費者之偏好差異狀況而定;若消費者對此產品之偏好差異小(大),則最適的品質研發補貼政策為補貼(課稅)。當本國廠商為低品質產品生產者時,本國廠商將提供最差之品質水準;如果本國廠商與外國廠商的品質水準差距不是很大(非常大),則本國政府可(無法)利用補貼政策誘使本國廠商成為高品質產品生產者,產生品質逆轉的現象。

Abstract

In this paper we set up a vertical product differentiation model to explore the relationship between the home government's quality-related R&D subsidy and the product quality choice made by the domestic firm, without making assumptions concerning home product positioning relative to imports. We show that the optimality of the quality-related R&D subsidy depends on the taste distribution among domestic consumers: the government should subsidize (tax) the high-quality domestic firm's quality-related R&D activity if the variance of this distribution is small (large). However, this subsidy has no effect on the quality choice of the domestic firm if the home firm decides to be a low-quality firm. We also show that the domestic government can grant the quality-related R&D subsidy to induce the domestic firm to raise its product quality and to leapfrog the rival imports if the exogenous quality level of the imports is not high.

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