最適策略性出口政策:從量補貼或從價補貼?
Optimal Strategic Export Policy: Specific or Ad Valorem Subsidy?
南台科技大學國際企業系(Department of International Business, Southern Taiwan University)
- 卷期
- 33卷3期
- 出版
- 2005年09月
- 頁碼
- 287–307
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006896
摘要
Bonder and Spencer(1985)假設本國政府採從量補貼,Eaton and Gross-man(1986)假設本國政府採從價補貼,他們都發現當本國廠商與外國廠商在第三國市場從事Cournot競爭時,本國的最適出口政策皆為對出口品補貼。本文考慮政府之補貼支出可能造成之租稅扭曲,進而對此二種出口政策之方向與其福利效果作比較。本文的分析結果顯示:當補貼支出不會造成租稅扭曲時,此二種最適政策皆為對出口品「補貼」,且從量補貼與從價補貼的福利效果完全相同。當補貼支出會造成租稅扭曲時,若租稅扭曲成本較小,則本國政府的最適政策為對出口品從量補貼;反之,若租稅扭曲成本較大,則本國政府的最適政策為對出口品從價課稅。
Abstract
This paper departs from the usual Brander-Spencer-Eaton-Grossman framework by taking into consideration the asymmetry between private and social costs, and hence the welfare cost of taxation distortion. It shows that when an export policy causes no taxation distortion, the optimal policy is an export subsidy, no matter whether a specific or an ad valorem subsidy policy is pursued, and the levels of domestic welfare are the same under the two policies. However, when there exists a welfare cost of distortional taxation, the optimal export policy is a specific subsidy if the welfare cost is low and an ad valorem tax if the welfare cost is high.