臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

出口與最適競爭政策

Export and the Optimal Competition Policy

劉惠聆(Hui-Ling Liu);邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou)

朝陽科技大學保險金融管理系(Department of Insurance, Chaoyang University of Technology);國立中央大學經濟系(Department of Economics, National Central University)

卷期
32卷3期
出版
2004年09月
頁碼
321–345
編號
NTUEJ00006911
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摘要

本文建立一個二出口國的寡占模型來討論出口國的競爭政策是否具有取代出口政策的效果。本文得到的結論如下。當本國與外國的出口競爭型態為Cournot數量競爭時,若廠商的邊際成本固定,則本國最適競爭政策可使得本國的總出口量達到單一Stackelberg領導者的產量水準,因此具有取代出口補貼政策的效果,且可使福利水準更為提高。在線性的市場需求下,當兩國廠商的邊際成本均呈遞增時,除非本國廠商的邊際成本遞增幅度遠教於外國廠商為低,否則,本國政府應採取較固定邊際成本更嚴格的競爭政策,讓本國廠商家數增加。若本國與外國廠商在第三國從事Bertrand的價格競爭,則當外國廠商家數越多或產品異質程度越高時,本國政府應採取越嚴格的競爭政策,使本國廠商加數增加。

Abstract

In a model of two export countries competing for a third-country market, we analyze whether a competition policy of an export country is able to replace an export policy. With Cournot competition, the optimal competition policy can replace the optimal export subsidy entirely, as stated in Brander and Spencer (1985, JIE), given constant marginal costs. This implies that the Stackelberg leader output levels can be achieved by optimal competition policy. However, in the case of increasing marginal costs (and at least linear demand), a stricter competition policy should be adopted to increase the number of domestic firms, unless the marginal costs of domestic firms are increasing more slowly than that of foreign firms. With Bertrand competition, a stricter competition policy should be used as (i) the number of foreign firms increase, or (ii) the degree of product heterogeneity increases.

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