污染與市場結構
Pollution and Market Structures
大葉大學國際企業管理學系((Department of International Business Management, Da-Yeh University);國立中正大學經濟系(Department of Economics, National Chung-Cheng University)
- 卷期
- 28卷4期
- 出版
- 2000年12月
- 頁碼
- 409–424
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006990
摘要
本文旨在比較課徵污染稅與防治污染補貼對改進環境品質的政策效果。在文獻上,假設可競爭性市場的結構下,對兩種政策效果加以比較。本文不僅對可競爭性市場加以考慮,同時也討論存在沉入成本的市場結構。雖然本文仍然支持Baumol and Dates (1988)的結果,但本文所得到的結果有更多的政策涵意,當沉入成本存在時,不論廠商的行為是天真的、競爭性的、或勾結的,沉入成本均會影響稅和補貼的政策效果。當沉入成本增加時,會削弱稅的政策效果,但可能削弱或加強補貼的政策效果,惟兩者的政策效果會逐漸接近。
Abstract
This paper compares the policy effects of a tax and a subsidy on improving environmental quality. The literature has considered contestable market, i.e., markets with easy entry and exit. This paper considers contestable markets as well as marke with sunk cost. Though this paper still supports the results of Baumol and Oates (1988), the results of this paper have more policy implications than theirs. When there exists entry difficulty due to a sunk cost, no matter what the firms' behavior is (naive, competitive or collusive), the sunk cost will influence the policy effects of the tax and subsidy. An increase in the sunk cost will weaken the policy effect of the tax, while it may weaken or strengthen the policy effect of a subsidy. When the sunk cost is increased, the policy effects of the tax and the subsidy will more similar.