裁量性政策宣告與央行的神祕色彩
Discretionary Policy Announcement and Central Bank Secrecy
逢甲大學經濟系(Department of Economics, Feng Chia University)
- 卷期
- 28卷4期
- 出版
- 2000年12月
- 頁碼
- 451–469
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006992
摘要
本文目的在對於各國央行慣有的神祕文化提出一種較合理的闡。在既有相關文獻中,多半解釋央行之所以一向保持神秘色彩,係因為央行較能在神祕面紗掩藏下製造貨幣性驚異(monetary surprises),以達到掌控經濟的目的。然而本文提出一個相反的論點:如果民眾猜想央行所不發佈的消息必為較差的消息,則央行擁有私有情報非但不是製造驚異的有利機會,反而可能是一項負擔。央行之所以神祕兮兮,並不是為了達到好的貨幣性驚異效果,而是因為情報透露的相關成本過高所致。
Abstract
The Fed has been criticized often for a peculiar and protective secrecy that surrounds monetary policymaking. One of explanation for this secrecy is that monetary authority can engineer surprise inflation under the cloak of secrecy. This paper examines the credibility of this assertion in an environment where the public knows the policymaker's motivation for monetary secrecy. The model develops a better understanding of the power role of information in the disclosure behavior of the monetary authority and the way in which concealment of policy intention might create burdens rather than opportunities. If it were not for the sake of the existence of disclo- sure-related costs, the burden of secrecy is always big enough to ``squeeze out" the disclosure of policy intention. Obviously, in this context, monetary secrecy is justified by the disclosure-related costs rather than monetary surprises.