臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

有效率競租悖論初解

A Complete Resolution of the Efficient Rent-Seeking Paradox

楊春雷(Chun-Lei Yang)

中央研究院人文社會科學研究所(Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica)

卷期
27卷4期
出版
1999年12月
頁碼
431–459
編號
NTUEJ00007013
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連結出處:國立台灣大學經濟學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

摘要

 政治競租文獻中爭議最大的問題之一是所謂的Tullock有效率競租悖論:現實觀察到的競租總投入遠低於理論所公認應有的程度。本文引進一個不對稱估價有序競租賽局,並證明次局完善均衡點的存在性。不對稱性較強時,均衡投入量幾乎為零;不對稱性不高時,均衡策略卻是先發制人。最後,我們證明先發制人型的均衡不穩定,會在模型結構有細微變化時消失。 投入量幾乎為零之均衡則具韌性。

Abstract

Political rent seeking has often been perceived as a black box with random outcomes affected by rent seekers' activities. One of the most puzzling problems in the literature is TuUocks efficient-rent-seeking paradox. This states that, contrary to common belief, total rent-seeking expenditures are consistendy observed to be much lower than theory would suggest. In a sequential rent-seeking game with asymmetric reservation values, we first show that subgame perfect equilibria always exist. Moreover, if the relative asymmetry is high, outcomes with almost-zero rent dissipation are sustainable, while preemption prevails in more symmetric cases. However, we can show that the preemptive outcomes are not robust against slight model changes while the almost efficient ones are.

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