經營權和所有權分離下的乘數效果與社會福利水準分析
Multiplier Effect and Social Welfare Analysis Under the Separation of Control and Ownership
國立中興大學經濟學系博士(Department of Economics, National Chung-Hsing University);中央研究院經濟研究所(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
- 卷期
- 27卷3期
- 出版
- 1999年09月
- 頁碼
- 359–375
- 編號
- NTUEJ00007019
摘要
本文有鑑於代廠商的運作模,是呈現經營權和所有權分離的現象,因此嘗試將經理人的生產偏好傾向納入考慮,用以重新評價社會福利水準、以及乘數效果;並藉此觀察:一旦偏離實際經濟現象,意即主觀認定廠商行為必是追求利潤極大時,對所得結果所可能產生的影響。結果我們發現:乘數效果的強弱、社會福利水準的高低,皆與股權分散程度有關。意即當股權愈分散,乘數效果愈弱,社會福利水準愈高;股權愈集中,則乘數效果愈強,社會福利水準愈低;又因為假定廠商追求利潤極大化的市場圾衡結果,和股權相當集中時的情況雷同,所以,一旦貿然認定廠商行為必是追求利潤極大時,除非實際經濟社會是呈現股權集中的現象,否則將會高估乘數效果,以及低估整個經濟體系的社會結果(social outcome)。既然社會福利水準的高低與股權分散程度有關,所以我們也認為:一旦資源配置結果無法達到Pareto最適,使得政府意欲干預市場時,則干預的方式,並不一定非得採取任意的刺激政策,盡量促使經濟體系內的股權分?,其實也是可行的方案。
Abstract
Since there is a separation of control and ownership in modern firms, we take managers' production preferences into consideration to re-evaluate standards of social welfare and the multiplier effect. We also examine all the possible effects resulting from the unrealistic assumption that all firms are pursuing maximum profits. The multiplier effect and social welfare are totally dependent upon how decentralized the total voting stock. The more decentralized the total voting stock, the weaker the multiplier effect and the higher social welfare; and vise versa. Only in the case of a very centralized total voting stock, will maximum profit be pursued therefore, unless the real world economy is centralized, the multiplier effect and market distortion will be overestimated.