勞工異質的偷懶模型中最低工資的就業效果
The Employment Effect of a Minimum Wage Law in a Shirking Model with Heterogeneous Workers
中央研究院經濟研究所(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
- 卷期
- 27卷2期
- 出版
- 1999年06月
- 頁碼
- 145–158
- 編號
- NTUEJ00007020
摘要
最近幾年來最低工資的採行對就業到底是會造成正面或負面的影響,在理論與實證的研究上引起廣泛熱絡的討論與爭辯。其中,Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)利用一修正的 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)勞工同質的效率工資模型,證明最低工資的採行在效率工資模型中會促進就業的增加。本文放寬Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的模型中勞工同質的假設而為勞工異質,卻發現最低工資的採行會使就業減少而非增加。由於勞工異質較勞工同質的假設切合實際,本文反駁Rebitzer and Taylor (1995)的論點。
Abstract
This paper uses the revised shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), as revised by Rebitzer and Taylor (1995), to investigate the employment effect of a minimum wage law. It is shown that when workers are homogeneous, a binding minimum wage may increase employment. However, when workers are heterogeneous, a minimum wage law that increases employment is not binding; a binding law, by contrast, decreases employment. Since the assumption of worker heterogeneity is more realistic, this study rebuts the validity of Rebitzer and Taylor's (1995) argument that a minimum wage law may increase employment in a shirking model with efficiency wages.