臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

「九.一八」前後「不抵抗」政策的再思考

"Non-Resistance" Policy of the Mukden Accident, 1931.

李君山

卷期
51期
出版
1999年12月
頁碼
165–196
編號
NTUEJ00008281
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摘要

「不抵抗」,在抗戰前中日關係史研究上,始終是一相當混淆的名詞。包括它是否成為一種「政策」、它的形成過程、內容與範圍、挫折與結束,乃至誰該為它負責,均是史家聚訟的課題。本文乃試圖從「政策」的角度,來重新思考「九.一八」前後,國民政府對日所謂「不抵抗」的問題。筆者以為,對於「九.一八」「不抵抗」的討論,應有必要區分成兩個層次:一為決策者在危機處理時,所供採擇的「選項」(alternative); 另一則指涉自「濟南事變」以來,國府針對日、俄軍事行動,所形成的一套「作業程序」。如此方能釐清目前此一課題研上的盲點。

Abstract

"Non-Resistance" is a confused term in the research of Sino-Japanese relations before 1937. Whether it is a "policy" or not, how it was formulated, what its contents and scope were, when it was abandoned, and who should be responsible for it are questions that researchers have debate. This article is an attempt to review these questions in terms of policy-analysis and takes the opinion that the concept of "Non-Resistance" should be discussed in terms of two spheres: first as an alternative for decision-makers to take in a time of crisis, and second as a set of operating procedures for the Chinese National Government to deal with the military invasion of Japan and the USSR in 1928. In this way, might be able to clarify the so-called "Non-Resistance" question of the Chinese Nationalist Government in the Mukden Accident of Sept. 18, 1931.

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